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 Bank Loan Loss Provisions Research: A Review 
 
Abstract 
We review several observations in the bank loan loss provisioning literature to identify and discuss 
several advances in the literature and to suggest possible directions for future research in the 
literature. We address several issues including the ethical dimensions of income smoothing, 
motivations and constrains to income smoothing, methodological issues in the bank loan loss 
provisions literature and the dynamic loan loss provisioning experiment. We identify some challenges 
in the literature and proffer directions for future research.  
JEL Code: G21; G28.  
Keywords: banks, dynamic provisioning, loan loss provisions, income smoothing, procyclicality, 
capital management, signalling, accounting discretion. 
 
1 Introduction 
Banks are financial institutions that primarily collect deposits and issue loans to individuals, firms and 
governments to finance consumption, investment and capital expenditures, thereby contributing to 
economic growth. Bank lending to borrowers gives risk to credit risk where borrowers are unable 
repay the principal and/or interest on bank loans due to unfavourable economic conditions and related 
factors. To mitigate this risk, in principle, banks would set aside a specific amount as a cushion to 
absorb expected loan losses and this amount is referred to as loan loss provisions (LLPs) or provisions 
for bad debts, therefore, loan loss provisions estimate is a credit risk management tool used by banks 
to mitigate expected losses on bank loan portfolio. However, there have been growing concern that 
bank LLPs are not solely driven by credit risk considerations but rather are influenced by other 
opportunistic financial reporting objectives. In this paper, we review the loan loss provisioning 
literature that address these concern and we attempt to proffer some solutions to ensure that bank loan 
loss provisions reflect its underlying economic reality. 
The banking sector is vital to national and global economies and play a key role as a depository 
institution and lender to firms, individuals and governments (Lobo, 2016). Given the importance of 
banks, loan loss provision estimates play a key role for bank stability and soundness while fulfilling 
their lending functions to society. Loan loss provisions continue to receive much attention from bank 
supervisors for the following reasons. One, banks’ large amount of loan on their balance sheet makes 
them vulnerable to loan defaults arising from deteriorating economic conditions which affects 
borrowers’ ability to repay which in turn require banks keep sufficient loan loss provisions (Laeven 
and Majnoni, 2003). Two, bank provisioning is generally procyclical and tend to worsen an existing 
recession if unanticipated, and this was evident at the peak of the 2008 financial crisis as many US 
and European banks significantly increased their loan loss provisions estimate which further eroded 
bank profits and led to losses which depleted bank capital. Three, loan loss provisions is a significant 
bank accrual and bank managers retain significant discretion in the determination of loan loss 
provisions estimates and such discretion can be exploited to meet opportunistic financial reporting 
objectives (Whalen, 1994). Four, bank loan loss provisions estimate is a crucial micro-prudential 
surveillance tool and a crucial indicator of the informativeness of bank accruals from an accounting 
standard-setting perspective. Five, bank provisions has become the most debated accounting number 
in bank financial reporting (after bank profitability and derivatives) since the 2008 global financial 
crisis. While we commend Wall and Koch (2000)’s early review that present a broad overview on 
loan loss provisions for over a decade now, we identify the need to bring together in one article the 
different (and recent) strand of literature on loan loss provisions in order to provide a comprehensive 
understanding of the role of bank provisions in accounting information quality and macro-financial 
stability. We therefore explore the strands of literature in LLP research to identify some recent 
advances in the literature, highlight some challenges in LLP research and suggest possible directions 
for future research with some concluding remarks. 
Our analysis in the paper contribute to the literature in the following way. One, our review contribute 
to the prudential regulation banking literature by demonstrating that bank provisions is linked to 
capital regulation and countercyclical policy designs aimed at ensuring banking soundness and 
solvency during stressed periods. Two, by relating LLPs to income smoothing, our study make a 
contribution to the broad earnings management literature by demonstrating that loan loss provisions 
estimates can be manipulated by bank managers to influence the level of reported earnings. Finally, 
we deliberately did not elaborated on some issues, the most important ones being the following two. 
First, we did not elaborate extensively on bank provisioning among Islamic banks because the 
distinction between Islamic and conventional banks is often unclear and the provisioning rules for 
both Islamic and convention banks are the same. Second, we did not elaborate extensively on dynamic 
provisioning because research on dynamic provisioning appears to be biased towards a single country 
analysis - Spain. Likewise, we did not elaborate on the relationship between discretionary provisions 
and stock returns because changes in stock price may be driven strongly by other unobservable factors 
rather than discretionary provisions. Additionally, our remarks on the challenges in the LLP literature 
are not intended to be comprehensive but instead are limited to issues in the literature that we find to 
be particularly significant. Finally, while we note that the value of a research review is measured by 
its success in inspiring researchers to produce new ideas to this line of research, our aim in this review 
is to elicit comments and stimulate debates that can potentially advance the LLP literature in the 
broader banking literature. 
The remainder of the study is organised as follows. Section 2 discuss several advances in the LLP 
literature and the ethical dimensions of income smoothing. Section 3 address the methodological 
advances and issues in literature. Section 4 present some challenges in LLP research. Section 5 
suggest some directions for future research. Section 6 provides some comments and concluding 
remarks. 
 
2. Loan Loss Provisions Research: Advances 
2.1. Importance of LLP research 
LLP research remain a fruitful area of banking research for four main reasons. One, LLP is the most 
significant discretionary accrual at the disposal of bank managers; two, because LLP has a direct 
impact on bank interest margin and overall earnings; three, because LLP is linked to bank regulators’ 
micro-prudential surveillance and is linked to the informativeness of accounting disclosures in 
financial reports required by accounting standard-setters and; four, because of the availability of bank-
year data on LLP estimates. Although LLP research may be complicated by: (i) the process that 
determine LLP estimates, that is, the assumptions, methodology and other unobservable managerial 
choices taken into consideration; and (ii) the cross-country differences in the accounting for loan loss 
provisions across countries, the LLP literature continue to exploit these variations to deepen our 
understanding of various manifestations of managerial provisioning discretion among banks across 
countries and regions. 
2.2. Research Areas and Future Direction 
Broadly, there are four strands of literature in LLP research. The first strand of literature relate to 
studies that test the capital management hypothesis commonly referred to as the LLP-capital 
management literature that examine whether banks increase LLPs when they have insufficient capital 
in order to compensate for their low equity capital levels (Kilic et al, 2012; Bonin and Kosak, 2013) 
or whether banks influence the size of LLPs to meet regulatory minimum capital requirements 
(Moyer, 1990; Ahmed et al., 1999). Notably, the work of Ahmed et al. (1999) is core to this strand of 
literature. Ahmed et al. (1999) examine 113 US banks during the 1986 to1995 period and find that 
banks use LLPs to manage minimum regulatory capital levels. Nonetheless, evidence to support the 
capital management hypothesis is inconclusive in the literature (Collins et al, 1995; Leventis et al, 
2011; Curcio and Hasan, 2015). With regard to bank equity capital, additional research is needed to 
provide insights on whether ‘specific’ or ‘general’ provisions are sensitive to bank equity capital 
levels rather than total bank provisions. Also, future research is needed to shed more light on whether 
abnormal changes in loan loss provisions are significantly associated with abnormal changes in bank 
equity capital.  
The second strand of literature relate to studies that test the signalling hypothesis commonly referred 
to as the LLP-signalling literature that examine whether banks use abnormal changes in LLPs to 
signal information about firms’ future prospects, implying that bank managers possibly report 
abnormal LLP estimates in anticipation of high future earnings or in anticipation of high non-
performing loans (Liu and Ryan, 1995; Liu et al, 1997; Kanagaretnam et al., 2005). In recent times, 
some bank practitioners may report abnormal loan loss provisions to mitigate loan losses arising from 
the loss of customer loyalty and business deals following the departure of a CEO whose influence is 
tied to greater customer loyalty and larger business deals for the bank. Future research on the LLP-
signalling hypothesis should provide insights on whether abnormal loan loss provisions is also used 
by bank managers to signal the forced removal of a bad CEO or the sudden exit of a good CEO.  
The third strand of literature is the cyclicality literature that investigate the behaviour of bank LLPs in 
relation to changing macroeconomic conditions. This literature argue that bank provisioning 
behaviour is procyclical with business cycle developments and reinforce the current state of the 
economic/business cycle (Bikker and Hu, 2002; Bikker and Metzemakers, 2005; Beatty and Liao, 
2009). By procyclical, they mean that when banks enter recessionary periods the rational response of 
bank managers is to decrease lending and increase LLPs. Increased bank provisioning during 
recessionary periods will further reduce bank net interest margin and decrease bank overall profit and 
worsen the state of banks during the recession. If the recession is sustained, bank capital may be 
completely wiped out which further worsen the state of banks and financial system.  
The fourth strand of literature recently investigate the possibility of adopting a dynamic provisioning 
system. Policy makers advocate the need for a counter-cyclical or dynamic provisioning system. A 
dynamic loan loss provisioning system is a loan loss provisioning system where banks report higher 
LLPs during good times and report fewer LLPs during economic downturns so that the surplus LLPs 
accumulated during good economic times is used to mitigate bank losses during economic downturns 
(Saurina, 2009). Spain adopted the dynamic provisioning system in the year 2000 and has remained 
the laboratory for policy and academic researchers to test the effectiveness of dynamic provisioning as 
a solution to eliminate provisions’ procyclical behaviour since its adoption (Fillat and Montoriol-
Garriga, 2010; Jiménez et al., 2012). Much focus on Spanish banks gave rise to concerns that such 
studies are biased towards Spanish banks only. A major weakness of any dynamic provisioning 
system is that it is only workable if the transition from an economic recession into an economic boom 
and vice versa, is easy for policy makers to detect; in practice, such transition is difficult to detect 
because ‘business cycle developments are hard to foresee, given their erratic duration and amplitude’ 
(Bikker and Metzemakers, 2005: 144). Another weakness is that the ability of a dynamic provisioning 
system to generate sufficient loan loss provision buffers in anticipation of stressed periods will depend 
on the severity of a crisis and the time lag of the existing crisis (Fillat and Montoriol-Garriga, 2010). 
Such dynamic provisioning system may not be sustainable if it is stress-tested against prolonged 
recessionary periods because loan loss reserves (provisions) would be exhausted if the recession is 
prolonged. 
The fifth strand of literature relate to studies that test the income smoothing hypothesis commonly 
referred to as the LLP-income smoothing literature that examine whether banks overstate (or 
understate) LLPs when earnings are high (or low) in order to report smooth earnings so that reported 
earnings never seem to be too high or too low (Laeven and Majnoni, 2003; Kanagaretnam et al., 2004; 
Bikker and Metzemakers, 2005; Liu and Ryan, 2006; Anandarajan et al., 2007; Fonseca and 
Gonzalez, 2008; Leventis et al., 2011; El Sood, 2012; Curcio and Hasan, 2015; Skala, 2015). While 
there are mixed conclusions to support the income smoothing hypothesis, the LLP-income smoothing 
literature remain the most extensively debated topic in the LLP research, therefore, section 2.3 focuses 
on the LLP-income smoothing debate literature. 
Another emerging theme in the LLP literature is the conflict between prudential regulatory objectives 
and accounting standard setting objectives (Gaston and Song, 2014). After the 2008 financial crisis, 
bank regulators require banks to take pro-active or forward-looking measures towards provisioning 
which includes keeping sufficient/high provisions even when expected credit risk is apparently low, 
amongst other measures, so that banks can have enough loan loss reserves/provisions to act as buffers 
to absorb loan losses that materialise during bad times (FSF, 2009; Adrian and Shin, 2010; Balla et al, 
2012). The practice of keeping provisions at an amount above the level that is commensurate with 
banks’ expected credit risk is considered to be consistent with the bank safety and stability of 
objective of bank supervisors from a prudential regulation perspective but is highly criticised by 
accounting standard setters because it constitute the manipulation of accounting numbers (i.e. LLP) 
which reduce the reliability of bank loan loss provisions estimates to bank stakeholder and analysts. In 
contrast to bank supervisors, international accounting standards (IFRS and FASB) oppose the 
provisioning for loan losses that are unlikely to occur and only approve of bank provisioning for loan 
losses that are highly probable if the amount of the loss can be reasonably estimated. The rationale is 
to prevent banks from using loan loss provisions (or reserves) to as a tool to manipulate/manage 
reported earnings - a common practice where bank managers could shift income from good quarters to 
bad quarters by taking large loan loss provisions when earnings are high and small provisions when 
income are low (Balla et al, 2012), and accounting standard-setters maintain that this kind of 
manipulation of provisions (and reserves) reduces the reliability and informativeness of loan loss 
provision estimates and the transparency of bank financial report. 
Finally, another strand of LLP research focus on country-specific studies and regional studies. Such 
studies examine the US [(El Sood, 2012; Balbao et al, 2013; Kilic et al, 2012; Balla and Rose, 2015)], 
European [(Leventis et al., 2011; Bouvatier et al., 2014; Curcio and Hasan, 2015; Skala, 2015; Ozili, 
2017)], cross-country [(Cavallo and Majnoni, 2002; Fonseca and Gonzalez, 2008; Bushman and 
William, 2012; Kar, 2015)] and Asian context [(Anandarajan et al, 2007; Packer and Zhu, 2012; Wu 
et al, 2015; Curcio et al, 2014; Bryce et al, 2015; Acar and Ipci, 2015; Abdul Adzis et al, 2016)]. The 
loan loss provisioning practices of banks in certain regional contexts remain unexplored in the 
literature such as the Sub-Saharan African (SSA) region and the Latin American and Caribbean 
(LAC) region. Future research is therefore needed to shed some insight about whether unique regional 
differences influence the provisioning behaviour of banks across several regions. 
2.3. Factors influencing bank income smoothing 
The LLP-income smoothing literature is the most debated issue in the LLP literature, therefore, this 
section focus on income smoothing via LLP. Bank income smoothing is the process by which banks 
make reported earnings appear stable (or smooth) over time so that reported earnings never seem to be 
too high or too low. While it is impossible to provide an exhaustive list of all the factors that influence 
bank income smoothing behaviour, we identify some notable factors in the literature that influence 
such behaviour. 
2.3.1. Motivation to Smooth Income: Evidence 
One, capital markets can create incentives for banks to smooth their reported earnings. There is the 
argument that if smoothed earnings reduces earnings variability then lower earnings variability would 
translate to lower stock price fluctuations which reduces the volatility of stock return and investors 
prefer lower stock return volatility. Anandarajan et al (2007) and Leventis et al (2011) find evidence 
to support this claim. Two, the need to avoid excessive regulatory scrutiny also create incentive for 
banks to smooth income particularly for larger firms that report excessive profits (Burgstahler and 
Dichev, 1997). Therefore, banks can smooth reported earnings to avoid excessive scrutiny of banks’ 
profit by bank regulators/supervisors. Three, regulatory arbitrage can create incentives to smooth 
income as banks can take advantage of the weakness in regulation as an opportunity to smooth 
reported earnings, given their opportunity. Kilic et al. (2012) investigate whether the strict recognition 
and classification requirements of SFAS 133 that reduced US banks' ability to use derivatives to 
smooth earnings encouraged the affected US banks to rely more on LLPs to smooth reported earnings 
rather than rely on derivatives. They find evidence that US banks use LLPs to smooth earnings when 
accounting disclosure regulation made it difficult to use derivatives to smooth bank earnings. Four, 
the trade-off between rule-based vs principles-based accounting standards can also create additional 
incentives for banks to smooth income. Ashraf et al (2014) investigate whether changes in accounting 
standards and prudential regulatory regime influence the use of LLPs to smooth earnings among 7343 
banks from 118 countries during the 1999 to 2010 period. They find that banks under a rule-based 
accounting regime exhibit higher levels of earnings smoothing compared to banks under a principles-
based accounting regime. Five, corruption can increase the extent of bank income smoothing because 
corruption in banks manifest through non-transparent reporting, and increased earnings smoothing 
decreases the transparency of bank financial reporting (Bhattacharya et al, 2003; Riahi-Belkaoui, 
2003). Six, competition also influence banks/firms to smooth income because earnings management 
in competitive environments may help firms prosper in the short-run but can at the same time reduce 
firms’ ability to compete in the long-run (Marciukaityte and Park, 2009). Francis et al (2004) observe 
that earnings smoothing help firms to reduce the cost of capital by reducing information asymmetry 
between managers and investors and increase the firms’ ability to compete while Marciukaityte and 
Park (2009) find that firms report higher earnings smoothing ratios and conclude that firms in 
competitive environments are more likely to engage in earnings smoothing practices. Seven, transient 
economic events can create additional incentives for banks to smooth income. Liu and Ryan (2006) 
find that US banks use LLPs to smooth income during the 1990 economic booms. El Sood (2012) 
finds that US banks accelerate LLPs to smooth earnings when they are more profitable and during 
non-recessionary periods while Balbao et al (2013) find that US banks use LLPs to smooth earnings 
when earnings are more profitable. Eight, national culture can encourage income smoothing 
behaviour among banks because banks in societies that encourage high risk-taking, implicitly as a 
culture, may record relatively lower LLPs in good times and higher LLPs in bad times which allow 
banks to smooth income. Kanagaretnam et al (2011) in a cross-country study examine the relationship 
between four dimensions of national culture and earnings quality during the pre-financial crisis period 
and find that banks in high individualism, high power distance and low uncertainty-avoidance 
societies report smoother earnings. They also observe that cultures that encourage higher risk-taking 
experience more bank troubles in the form of larger losses or larger provisions during the global 
financial crisis. 
2.3.2. Constraint to Smooth Income: Evidence 
One, strict accounting disclosure regulation can reduce bank managers’ opportunity to manipulate 
LLP estimates to smooth reported earnings. Leventis et al. (2011) investigate bank income smoothing 
during mandatory IFRS adoption among some listed EU banks and find that the use of LLPs to 
smooth earnings is reduced after IFRS adoption. Balla and Rose (2015) examine whether accounting 
constraints introduced by the US SEC in 1998 limit LLP-based income smoothing and find that 
shortly after the SEC enforced the accounting constraint the relationship between LLPs and earnings 
weakened for publicly-held banks but not for privately-held banks. Abdul Adzis et al. (2016) 
investigate the impact of IAS 39 among Hong Kong banks and find that bank income smoothing via 
LLP is reduced after the adoption and compliance with IAS 39. Two, strong religiosity can discourage 
the use of LLP estimates to manipulate reported earnings. Kanagaretnam et al. (2015) investigate the 
impact of religiosity on bank earning quality and find that religiosity is negatively related to earnings 
smoothing. Taktak et al. (2010) did not find evidence for bank income smoothing via LLPs for 
Islamic banks. Farook et al (2014) observe that Islamic banks consistently record lower loan loss 
provisions relative to conventional banks. Three, higher audit quality can constrain the extent of 
income smoothing because the presence of Big-4 auditor in firms is often considered to reflect 
superior audit quality and their presence should discourage opportunistic earnings manipulation 
(DeAngelo, 1981). Kanagaretnam et al. (2010) find less aggressive income smoothing behaviour 
among banks that have a Big-4 auditor. Four, investor protection can discourage bank income 
smoothing. Foncesa and Gonzalez (2008) in a cross country study find that bank earnings smoothing 
behaviour decreases with stronger investor protection while Shen and Chih (2005) find that strong 
protection of minority shareholders rights discourage bank earnings management but legal 
enforcement quality had no impact on bank earnings management. Five, bank ownership structure can 
provide additional monitoring to discourage bank income smoothing. Fan and Wong (2002) 
investigate the relationship between earnings informativeness and ownership structure for 977 
companies in seven East Asian economies and find that concentrated ownership is associated with 
low earnings informativeness. Leuz et al. (2003) find that industrial firms with dispersed ownership 
structure engage in less earnings management. Gebhardt and Novotny-Farkas (2011) investigate the 
implication of mandatory IFRS adoption for the accounting quality of EU banks and find that income 
smoothing is pronounced among listed European banks that are widely held (dispersed ownership). 
Bouvatier et al. (2014) examine the impact of ownership concentration on the earnings smoothing 
practices of EU banks and find that income smoothing is reduced among banks with dispersed 
ownership. Six, strict banking supervision can reduce the extent of bank income smoothing. Cavallo 
and Majnoni (2002) and Bouvatier et al. (2014) also show that bank income smoothing is reduced 
among banks in countries with strong banking supervision. 
2.3.3. Is Income Smoothing Ethical? 
Finally, in this section we address the issue of ethics and income smoothing. The question above seem 
easy but is difficult to answer and whatever answer we postulate depends on what we mean by 
‘ethical’ while noting that the meaning of the term ‘ethics’ depend on the context and circumstance of 
the social agent(s) facing such ethical dilemma. Moreover, income smoothing behaviour itself does 
not constitute an outright violation of bank regulatory/supervisory rules and do not constitute an 
outright violation of accounting standards whether rule-based or principles-based because income 
smoothing practices arise from exercising managerial discretion in financial reporting and in meeting 
prudential regulatory requirements and both regulatory frameworks permit managerial discretion in 
bank financial reporting. This, therefore, leave academics, policy researchers, regulators and 
accounting standard-setters with the question: is it ethical for firms or banks to smooth income? 
Whether income smoothing is ethical or unethical should depend on the motive for doing so. Income 
smoothing by bank managers may be considered ethical if they do so to: save for a rainy day 
(Greenawalt and Sinkey, 1988), to protect their jobs (DeFond and Park, 1997, Fudenberg and Tirole, 
1995), to reduce information asymmetry between owners and managers (Tucker and Zarowin, 2006), 
to improve bank stability by smoothing out abnormal fluctuations in bank reported earnings (Wall and 
Koch, 2000), and to improve the risk perception of banks to bank bondholders and 
regulators/supervisors (El Sood, 2012). On the other hand, income smoothing by banks may be 
considered unethical if they do so to: opportunistically receive bonuses (Healy, 1985), reduce the 
informativeness of reported earnings (Leventis et al, 2011), increase the opacity of bank financial 
reporting (Bhattacharya et al, 2003), to lower the quality of reported earnings (Ahmed et al, 2013), 
and to avoid shareholder interference or to avoid tax and improve terms of trade and pursue a fixed 
dividend pay-out ratio (Vander Bauwhede, 1998). 
 
3. Methodological: Advances and Issues 
In the literature (Wahlen, 1994; Ahmed et al, 1999; Laeven and Majnoni, 2003), the baseline model to 
investigate the determinants of bank provisioning is expressed as:  
Discretionary Provisions = f (non-discretionary provisions, relevant bank-specific factors, institutional 
factors, country and regional factors) 
Depending on the objective of the researcher, the empirical researcher would specify the regression 
model to obtain the functional form of the relationship he or she is investigating. For this reason, it is 
difficult to criticise the LLP regression model employed by a researcher without understanding the 
research objective and the underlying assumptions taken into consideration by the researcher. In 
addition to specifying a good LLP model, the researcher will make specific econometric adjustments 
to the LLP model involving either pooled/panel adjustments, static/dynamic panel adjustments, 
system/difference GMM model adjustments and other variations including fixed or random effects 
(see. Laeven and Majnoni, 2003; Cavallo and Majnoni, 2002; Packer and Zhu, 2012; Floro, 2010; 
Leventis et al, 2011; El Sood, 2012; Bouvatier et al, 2014; Curcio and Hasan, 2015). Some studies 
combine regression models with other methods in their analyses while only few studies employ a non-
regression methodology while examining bank LLPs (see. Balasubramanyan et al., 2013).  
One main progress in LLP modelling has been the reduction in construct validity problems. Unlike 
the construct validity issues commonly associated with using accruals to measure earnings quality in 
the earnings quality literature (DeFond, 2010)1, the measures (or proxies) used to capture 
                                                          
1 Dechow et al (2010) presents an extensive literature review on earnings quality. 
 
discretionary LLPs and its non-discretionary determinants most LLP models have relatively lower 
construct validity problems because there have been strong commitment among banking researchers 
to ensure that the LLP constructs and the explanatory variables measure what it intends to measure. 
Also, multiple explanatory factors have been used among empirical studies to reduce the size of the 
error term such as commission and fee income which reflects bank income diversity, that is, banks’ 
willingness to engage in non-depository activities; and when this is the case, banks will keep more 
LLPs to remain safe while it offer multiple services that are not related to its core deposit-taking 
activities (Anandarajan et al, 2007; Leventis et al, 2011). Also, the pooling together of large banks 
with small banks raise serious concern that the LLP estimate and total asset value for large and small 
banks might be skewed due to substantial bank size differences. One way to address this issue is to 
normalise the LLP and total asset variables by taking the natural logarithm of LLP and total asset.  
One major research design issue in the empirical literature is the choice of a deflator for the LLP 
variable and the earnings explanatory variable. Commonly used deflators are: total assets (Cavallo 
and Majnoni, 2002; El Sood, 2012; Bouvatier et al, 2014; Curcio and Hasan, 2015, Ozili, 2015), 
beginning total assets (Kanagaretnam et al, 2010; Kilic et al, 2012), beginning total loans (Bushman 
and William, 2012), gross or average loan (Anandarajan et al, 2007; Leventis et al, 2011). For 
instance, the use of average loan as a deflator for the earnings variable takes into account the business 
model of the bank while use the beginning total asset deflator takes into account banks’ actual size 
without reference to future investments in bank assets. To date, the literature show no consensus on 
the choice of deflator. Finally, while a common trend in social science research involves creating 
proxies for phenomena that cannot be directly observed, there is a high degree of confidence that the 
proxies used in LLP research (published in peer-reviewed journal) actually measure the underlying 
theoretical constructs they are intended to measure. 
 
4. Challenges in LLP Research 
4.1. Comparability of LLP estimates 
LLP research can be complicated by the process, assumptions, methods and other unobservable 
factors that bank managers take into consideration to determine loan loss provision estimates. This 
means that LLP estimate is a function of the accounting system that generates the estimate, the 
assumptions made and the decisions of the manager and other considerations that remains unknown or 
unobservable to the empirical researcher. Because researchers are not privy to full information 
regarding the determination of LLP estimates, the comparability of LLP estimates from one bank to 
another bank can be difficult and even more difficult when comparing LLP estimates among banks 
across countries, thus, making it difficult to compare the findings of several empirical studies. 
4.2. Two Conflicting LLP Estimates. 
International accounting standards (IFRS) propose the incurred loss provisioning model while the 
Basel Committee for Banking Supervision (BCBS) propose the expected credit loss provisioning 
model.2 The expected credit loss model generates higher LLP estimate while the incurred loss model 
                                                          
2 There are two provisioning models: the incurred loss model and the expected credit loss model introduced by 
accounting standard setters and Basel regulation, respectively. Basel II regulation employs the ‘expected credit 
loss provisioning’ model which emphasize the recognition of credit risk based on the borrower’s economic and 
financial conditions even if the loss has not been incurred (see. Gaston and Song, 2014; BCBS, 2015). The 
objective of this model is to build sufficient provisions, in addition to bank capital, to cover the risk bank takes. 
The incurred loss provisioning model, on the other hand, require banks to increase loan loss reserves 
generates a lower LLP estimate. These two models yield two different LLP estimates and therefore 
pose a challenge for LLP research. For instance, if banks are not required to strictly adopt one of the 
two models, bank managers can choose to adopt the expected credit loss provisioning model in order 
to reduce excessive profit because the model generate high LLPs or bank managers can choose to 
adopt the incurred loss provisioning model in order to increase low earnings because the model 
generate lower LLPs. While there is yet no definitive solution to reconcile the conflict between these 
two estimates (Bushman and Landsman, 2010; Balla et al, 2012), one possible policy attempt to 
reconcile this conflict would be to persuade accounting standard-setters to replace the incurred loss 
model with a forward-looking provisioning model that is in line with the expected credit loss 
provisioning model (Gaston and Song, 2014). Nevertheless, any attempt to reconcile these conflict 
should take into account (i) the role of the complex interaction between the accounting, 
macroeconomic and prudential framework of a country; (ii) the fact that the level of loan loss 
provision estimates (in the income statement) and the adequacy of loan loss reserve (in the balance 
sheet) is only as good as the methodology employed to estimates losses in the loan portfolio 
(Angklomkliew et al, 2009), and that forward-looking provisioning gives bank managers a licence to 
engage in speculative provisioning practices (Bushman and William, 2012). 
4.3 Paucity of Critical Studies 
A fourth concern is the paucity of critical studies in the LLP literature. By critical studies, we do not 
refer to critical research that invalidates prior findings. Rather, we refer to studies that challenge the 
proxies used and assumptions underlying current LLP models in order to increase the commitment of 
researchers to ensure that existing and new proxies continue to measure what they are intended to 
measure. The need for such type of studies to emerge in the literature is paramount. One reason for 
this could be because policy makers, financial economists and empirical banking academics are more 
interested in LLP research that is result-driven, that is, the need to see results compared to academics. 
Moreover, academic researchers interested in LLP research continue to take a positivist approach to 
LLP research which further contribute to the paucity of critical LLP studies. The fewer the number of 
academics in this line of research, the more difficult it is for critical studies to emerge. 
4.4. Qualitative Studies 
The final concern is that the empirical LLP literature is dominated by quantitative methods while 
there are little or no qualitative studies on LLP research. A look at the first forty peer-reviewed LLP 
articles chosen at random in Google scholar search from 2012 to 2016 confirm that LLP studies that 
use qualitative or non-regression models are unpopular among empirical and policy LLP studies at 
least for now. There are only few studies that use qualitative research methods mainly 
Balasubramanyan et al (2013). One reason for this in our view is that LLP research appears to be of 
little of interest to the qualitative or non-empirical researcher. We need to find a way to attract the 
interest of non-empirical researchers to LLP research because there are interesting research questions 
that regression models cannot provide answer to. Also, we need qualitative studies to verify/check 
whether the findings of qualitative LLP research are consistent with the theory underlying the findings 
of empirical LLP studies. 
 
 
                                                          
(provisions) only when it becomes highly probable that a loss is imminent, and if the amount of that loss can be 
reasonably estimated. 
5 Additional Future Direction 
One, continuous revisions to Basel capital accord continue to provide opportunities for future LLP 
research. Basel II and III have implemented some changes to bank capital regulation which also 
require a change in the way banks use loan loss provisions. These changes will take years for its full 
effect to be felt. While prior studies investigate the impact of Basel I on bank provisioning decisions, 
studies that examine the impact of Basel II and III on discretionary bank provisioning are yet to 
emerge. Future studies could investigate the impact of Basel III regulation on banks’ provisioning 
discretion. 
Two, the literature do not provide insight on the provisioning practices of banks that are classified as 
‘systemic important financial institutions’ (SIFIs) compared to bank that are classified as ‘non-
systemic important financial institutions’ (non-SIFIs). This classification of banks and other financial 
institutions as ‘systemic’ is recent and there is little knowledge in the literature about the financial 
reporting properties of systemic firms. Therefore, it is interesting to investigate whether systemic 
important financial institutions use loan loss provisions differently than non-systemic important 
financial institutions and whether systemic important financial institutions collectively use provisions 
to report competitive earnings and to manage capital levels. 
Three, with regard to income smoothing, capital management and the signalling hypotheses, prior 
studies pay little attention to whether there are overlapping motivations to distort LLP estimates and 
the factors that lead to the choice of one motivation over the other. By overlapping motivations, we 
mean that bank managers may feel the pressure to signal information to investors and to smooth 
income at the same time but they can only achieve one at a time not both. Future research can provide 
insights to improve our understanding of banks’ decision regarding the use of LLPs when they face 
conflicting motivations. 
Four, in dynamic provisioning, there is the argument that increased scrutiny and supervision should 
guide the implementation of dynamic provisioning process (Bikker and Metzemakers, 2005). Future 
research is needed to demonstrate how monitoring and supervisory models would guide regulators in 
a dynamic loan loss provisioning system while bearing in mind that the willingness of bank 
regulators/supervisors to supervise bank provisioning decisions may also depend on (i) whether 
regulators believe they should supervise banks’ accounting practices; (ii) the extent to which 
regulators believe auditors should perform the supervisory role; (iii) whether an independent 
supervisory body should be created to perform this role even if doing this further complicates the 
already complex accounting, fiscal and prudential bank regulatory network. Future research could 
clarify how supervision will guide the dynamic provisioning process and not interfere with the 
accounting and audit role. 
 
6 Comments and Concluding Remark 
Counter-cyclical or dynamic loan loss provisioning is a policy experiment and just like every 
experiment caution must be taken. Bank supervisors in many countries are reluctant to enforce a 
dynamic provisioning system for banks because it is a policy experiment and, of course, experiments 
can go wrong. However, many countries may finally adopt this system of provisioning in the near 
future as more country-specific success stories emerge, for example, in Spain. The usual caveat 
applies, that the best solution is not always implemented if the perceived cost outweighs its benefits. 
If the perceived cost of implementing and monitoring a dynamic bank provisioning system is greater 
than its intended benefit, then dynamic provisioning may not be implemented in some countries at 
least for now even if it solves the problem of LLP procyclicality. While the on-going debate seem to 
converge towards the need for national bank supervisors to adopt dynamic provisioning, the process 
of determining the exact time to trigger dynamic provisions during business cycle developments 
remain an inexact science. 
Two, another issue worth noting is that accounting standard-setters face political pressure to replace 
the incurred-loss provisioning model with the expected credit loss provisioning model. From 
legitimacy theory, we know that accounting is socially constructed and exists within a context 
(Guthrie and Parker; 1989; Deegan, 2006) in this case, the banking industry. To retain its legitimacy, 
accounting standard setters will bow to the pressure of bank regulators in order to maintain their 
legitimacy within the banking industry. Accordingly, the expect credit loss provisioning model in 
IFRS 9 (to be implemented in 2018) will eventually replace the incurred-loss model. 3 The new IFRS 
9 provisioning model does not specify a particular measurement methodology to estimate LLPs but 
permit significant managerial discretion in determining what LLP estimates should be. Such 
discretion is permitted to allow banks meet the needs of bank regulators/supervisors although it 
remain critical that banks can exploit such discretion to smooth or manipulate reported earnings.  
Conclusions drawn from this review is that LLP research have made a significant transition from 
country-specific and regional studies towards studies that examine how LLP interacts with the larger 
macroeconomic, accounting, cultural, prudential and institutional framework in the economy. 
However, there is the need to actively limit bank managers’ discretion in determining the level of loan 
loss provisions estimates. Regardless of the novelty of any provisioning system imposed on banks by 
regulators, if bank managers continue to retain significant control on what inputs to include in, or 
exclude from, their LLP models, then such models may not yield the intended level of provisioning 
bank supervisors expect. If standard setters, bank supervisors and policy makers do not pay attention 
to specific accounting judgements made by bank managers in relation to LLPs, the issue of 
opportunistic income smoothing behaviour is likely to remain. From a standard setting perspective, 
there should be a limit to managerial discretion because it appear to be illogical for standard-setters to 
have evidence that bank managers opportunistically manipulate LLPs to smooth income, manage 
regulatory capital and to signal future prospects, and then blame a methodology for such practice 
without putting the blame on managers who make provisioning decisions themselves. 
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